

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, EUR		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, Munich Liaison Base		XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK Meeting with UTILITY 9 March 1967.		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>1. [] advised UTILITY on the background of the [] case, emphasizing that []'s activities had confined themselves purely to the briefing of [] on the KGB and its activities against foreign diplomats in Moscow. Heavy emphasis was placed on the fact that this was only a defensive briefing which [] undertook as a friendly service to [] because of their friendship and close association, and that there was no intent to solicit [] cooperation in any substantive intelligence activity.</p> <p>2. UTILITY indicated that he was very concerned over recent Soviet activities against the Western world, primarily in the fields of political action, disinformation, and active penetration operations. UTILITY opined that the Soviets are making a major effort to sow dissension between the Western allies, and in this effort are playing all registers of the intelligence game, ranging from their efforts to establish controlled agents with influential positions in Western governments, penetration of political parties of the Right and Left in Western countries, and last but not least, aggravating natural, but not necessarily major, disagreements between Western nations by using all elements of their disinformation potential.</p> <p>3. [] indicated to UTILITY that there initially was some concern that there could be some embarrassing publicity concerning student operations in Germany; however, that a close review of our activities had shown that we were not engaging in any activities in this sector which could give cause for concern. UTILITY's reaction was rather relaxed and he indicated that the type of political action operation utilizing students, labor unions and other groups of this kind were a traditional and historical modus operandi in the conflict</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - Chief, EUR 2 - Chief, MLB</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p> <p>GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO D 32W-2-23/1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA-33950	DATE MAR 28 1967 23 March 1967	
D 32W-2-24/1	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 32-W-5-25/1 C	

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGNA-33950
<p>between East and West, and that any revelations that we were engaging in such activity would not cause him any great surprise or concern.</p> <p>4. UTILITY mentioned that the emergency legislation which was recently approved by the cabinet did include as an addendum a law on the monitoring of communications. He mentioned that the specifics of this law were still undergoing some changes; however, that he hoped to be able to make available to us a draft copy of the law in the not too distant future.</p> <p>5. [] mentioned the assignment to and forthcoming arrival in Munich of []. UTILITY's reaction to []'s assignment was very, very positive. While making appropriate noises about the excellent job that [] had been doing, UTILITY made it quite clear that he and his staff greatly appreciated []'s familiarity with German and Austrian affairs, and especially his excellent background on CATUSK and its relation with WOFACT. He also mentioned that []'s previous association with CATUSK had won him many friends who had not forgotten him and that this particular aspect should make it very easy for him to quickly get into the swim of things.</p> <p>6. Within the context of requesting [] to apologize to [] for UTILITY's frequent postponements of his visit to [], UTILITY mentioned that he hoped to be able to communicate a definite date in about four weeks but that problems he was encountering with some of his adversaries in the new government precluded him from committing himself to a specific date at present. He emphasized that the problems were such that he did not feel that he could leave Germany for any period of time prior to having taken care of them, or at least having localized them.</p> <p>7. UTILITY in commenting on the furor that the NPT negotiations had caused in Germany, made it clear that while he had not made any official comment on this matter, or actively participated in the formulation of German policy, his personal views on the NPT were negative. Not only did he believe that Germany's accession to the NPT would adversely affect its capability to exploit atomic energy for peaceful uses, but it would be a serious obstacle to the ultimate establishment of a European nuclear force which he considered essential for the security of Western Europe. In continuing his commentary, UTILITY said that he felt that the worldwide commitments of the United States, especially the considerable effort that it had to expend in Southeast Asia, would adversely affect U. S. capability to forcefully react to challenges on the European continent, and that this was causing him, and indeed many other thinking Germans, considerable concern.</p>		
FORM 53a G-60 1401	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	2.